Dave,

Once I reread the history of cybernetics as written down by Catherine Hayles (http://www.press.uchicago.edu/presssite/metadata.epl?mode=synopsis&bookkey=3638798). In one of the early chapters she reviews the Macy conferences that were held after WWII from 1946 until 1953. See wikipedia.

From that book I learned that Shannon (who focussed on capacity of a channel and the effect of noise) had an adversary named Donald McKay who defined information as "data that induced a change in the recipient". A definition of information that resonates quite well with me :-) as it is much closer to sensemaking. I wished I had access to Cf. Donald M. MacKay, 'The wider scope of information theory', in Machlup and Mansfeld, The study of information, 485-492; esp.486-487 or http://www.springerlink.com/content/g73445hv06507327/ where one speaks of a relation between mechanism and meaning.

But now back to the story: Because of the pro's that were seen by the military and IT industry in Shannon's information view, McKay and coworkers have been marginalized in the following decades. Most of the research money went (as we all know) into information processing and AI, the latter with no mentionable results BTW. This repression of McKay's view is still visible today from the fact that most of the traces of his presence at the Macy conferences have been wiped out.

PS: The "data" in McKay's definition is not what we today generally call data, it includes signals such as light striking the eye and has therefore lots of connections with articles like "What the frog's eye tells the frog's brain" by JY Lettvin, HR Maturana, WS McCulloch, WH Pitts (Proceedings of the IRE, 1959).

Interesting reading, as always.

I'm not arguing with your thesis, on the contrary I support it, but regarding Intention I paused to think what difference to a human complex system Intention would actually make compared to a non-human one, if we accept that human intentions aren't always predictable, and as you stated: "...humans can choose to do things for a range of reasons, many of which may not make sense for the individual."

Wouldn't that mean that the unpredictability of human actions, considering they're often counter-intuitive and/or illogical from the systems perspective (they might feel/be logical from the individual perspective), essentially returns the human system back to the dynamics of a non-human complex adaptive system, where no such Intention is exhibited by the agents?

In short, if the actions of both human and non-human agents in a system are largely unpredictable, from the systems dynamics point of view, how does human intention make a human complex adaptive system different form a non-human one?

The answer may be obvious, I don't have enough theoretical background to deduce it, but it's something I've been thinking about for a while, and your blog entry reminded me of it.

In 'Ulysses and the Sirens' Jon Elster makes the point that people can decide to go through a sub-optimum point to reach a higher state (reculer pour mieux sauter), but that natural systems cannot have such intentionality e.g. biological systems will always hill-climb. This is caught under your intention heading but (for me anyway) it makes the human/natural distinction very clear.

Agreed, the distinction as such is clear, I was thinking more about the practical implications of the differences in the dynamics of a complex system with agents exhibiting (human) cognitive behavior vs. minimally cognitive behavior like ants, and whether it make a difference from the systems dynamics point of view what prompts the agent in a system to choose a particular action. And if it does, what does it mean from the sensemaking point of view, and working in an organization exhibiting complex behavior.

Perhaps from the practical point of view and the way I understand it (rightly or wrongly), the human factor in the cognitive behavior of an agent allows us to make localised behavioral predictions about the human complex system, how people would be likely to act in a given environment and a situation. It gives us boundaries/constraints, guides us in creating Probes for safe-fail experiments in a complex system, and in determining the amplification/dampening strategies (re Dave's excellent Cynefin video on YouTube).

My point on intention was a contrast with modeling of natural systems, herding, flocking, ants responding to scent etc. In effect I am talking about simulation capability (and of course simulation and prediction should not be confused).

I think the unpredictibility can arise from the relationship between identity and intent. I.e. which identity I am adopting at a point in time may cause my intentions to change. This is also where systems dynamics can break down in a complex environment, a model that works for one identity can breakdown when the actors change their identities. For example some event can cause a shift from a "product team member" identity to an "union member" identity causing a different impact on the system. When you factor in many possible identities it becomes to much for a systems dynamics model to handle.

Agree that with Intention (humans have agenda's)
http://johntropea.tumblr.com/post/183217248/organisations-are-not-systems-at-all-not-living

I like Chris Rodgers perspective:

http://johntropea.tumblr.com/post/945825463/organisations-are-not-complex-adaptive-systems

"To treat an organization as a CAS would require...a set of rules would need to be imposed by someone outside the system boundary (as with the ‘programmer’). And those rules would have to be followed precisely and without exception. Unfortunately (or fortunately, perhaps) these conditions don’t apply. First, managers (the presumed programmers) are not external observers and controllers of other people’s actions; they are involved participants. Secondly, people don’t tend to follow rules, simple or otherwise. Issues of power, ideology, self interest, emotion and identity etc are always in play. Thirdly, organizations are not systems, in the sense that this is usually meant. Amongst other things, they don’t have boundaries. And, whereas a hand, say, (as part of the human body) can’t function if it is cut off from the body as a whole, an individual can – and does – function independently of ‘the organization’”

I took some notes on Steven Johnson's book on emergence:

http://johntropea.tumblr.com/post/66695900/emergence-steven-johnson-p97-99

“it’s very hard to imagine any human society in which people would go around responding to what happened at that moment without any conception of why they’re doing”

Interesting...that like ants we are often ignorant of the macro picture we are assisting to emerge

"Human behaviour works at two comparable scales…driving a car has short-term and long-term consequences.
The short term influences whether we make it to soccer practice on time; the long term alters the shape of the city itself.
We interact directly with, take account of-and would seem to control-the former. We are woefully unaware of the latter"

We can't be compared to cells, yet the irony is this is what we are made of
http://johntropea.tumblr.com/post/66413249/one-group-of-cells-may-be-the-beginning-of-an

Lots of reading for me to do on CAS - rhizomes, stigmergy, autopoiesis
http://www.delicious.com/johnt/stigmergy
http://www.delicious.com/johnt/autopoiesis